Security and Stability Advisory Committee

Activities Update

ICANN Durban Meeting

July 2013
1. SSAC Overview and Activities – Patrik Fältström
2. SAC059: SSAC Letter to the ICANN Board Regarding Interdisciplinary Studies
3. Variants Work Party Update – Patrik Fältström
4. Root Key Rollover Work Party Update – Russ Mundy
5. Abuse of the DNS Work Party Update – Merike Kaeo
Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC) Overview

- Provides guidance to ICANN Board, Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees, staff and general community.
- Charter: To advise the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the security and integrity of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems.
- Members: 39; appointed by ICANN Board for 3-year terms.
2013 Work Plan: Current Activities

• SSAC Membership
• DNSSEC Workshop
• Identifier Abuse Metrics
• Root Key Rollover
• SSAC Meetings with Law Enforcement
• IGF Workshop
• Abuse of the DNS for DDoS Attacks
• Comment on Variant TLDs Report
• Namespace Collisions
• Response to Expert Working Group on gTLD Directory Services
Domain Name System (DNS) Security and Abuse

[SAC059]: SSAC Letter to the ICANN Board Regarding Interdisciplinary Studies – 18 April 2013

[SAC058] SSAC Report on Domain Name Registration Data Validation Taxonomy — March 2013

[SAC057] SSAC Advisory on Internal Name Certificates — March 2013

[SAC056]: SSAC Advisory on Impacts of Content Blocking via the Domain Name System — 09 October 2012

[SAC053] SSAC Report on Dotless Domains—February 2012
Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)
[SAC052] SSAC Advisory on Delegation of Single-Character Internationalized Domain Name Top-Level Domains—January 2012

Registration Data (WHOIS):
[SAC055] SSAC Comment on the WHOIS Review Team Final Report—September 2012
[SAC054] SSAC Report on the Domain Name Registration Data Model—June 2012
SAC059: SSAC Letter to the ICANN Board Regarding Interdisciplinary Studies

Patrik Fältström
Overview

• On 13 September 2012 the Board of Directors asked the SSAC to provide advice on how “interdisciplinary studies of security and stability implications from expanding the root zone more than an order of magnitude should be carried out and whom else should be consulted.”

• SAC059 provides the SSAC’s advice on the composition of the interdisciplinary study team, broad topics and specific examples the team may wish to consider, and suggestions on how the studies should be performed.
The goal of the studies should be two fold:

• Engage with communities that may not have been fully consulted by previous investigations on the impacts of the new gTLD program; and

• Explore areas of concern relating to expansion of the root zone that either derive from those communities or which have been identified by previous studies but that may not have been fully resolved.
IDN Variant TLD
Work Party Update

Patrik Fältström
Overview

• This SSAC Work Party is commenting the reports produced by the ICANN IDN Variant TLD programs
• The SSAC Report comments on the following:
  • Label Generation Rules (LGR) Procedure for the root zone
  • LGR’s Repertoire & Variant Generation Rules
  • LGR’s change process
  • Other User experience report recommendations
The SSAC provides comments on the following issues:

- **Conservatism principle** with respect to allowable code points, and number of active variants
- **Process** to handle situations in which the community disagrees with ICANN’s variant calculation
- **Backward compatibility** of LGR 2.0 with LGR 1.0
- **Root LGR’s applicability** to second level and higher levels
- **Operation Readiness** of ICANN’s new TLD functions with respect to variants
Next Steps

• The Work Party has produced a document for the full SSAC review till 17 July.

• After that the Work Party will finalize the document for publication.
Root Key Rollover
Work Party Update

Russ Mundy
Overview

• This SSAC Work Party is considering issues relating to the rollover of the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Key-Signing Key (KSK).

• This work is not meant to result in a definitive advisory, but will provide an inventory and study of the issues related to a key rollover.

• The Work Party is exploring:
  • Possible root zone KSK rollover scenarios; and
  • Complications and complexities unique to the handling of root zone keys.

• IANA also held a recent public consultation on the contract requirement to perform a scheduled root zone KSK rollover. The Public Comment period ended on 31 May. Further consultation with the community is expected in the next few months.
The Work Party is considering the following issues:

• Key Management in the Root Zone
  • Zone-Signing Key (ZSK) Operational Role; and
  • Key-Signing Key (KSK) Operational Role.
• Motivations for KSK Rollover.
• Risks Associated with Key Rollover
• Available Mechanisms for Key Rollover:
  • RFC 5011 Rollover;
  • Non-RFC 5011 Rollover; and
  • Common Resolver Rollover Requirements.
• DNS Response Size Considerations.
Next Steps

- The Work Party will produce a document for the review of the full SSAC.
- The SSAC will decide whether and/or when to publish the final document.
Abuse of the DNS Work Party Update

Merike Kaeo
Targeted audience is primarily DNS operators:
• Authoritative DNS operators;
• Recursive DNS operators; and
• Both ISPs and Enterprises.

Goal is to highlight current ongoing problems and provide scope of malicious/criminal activities that utilize the DNS infrastructure.

Reference existing SSAC work that has not been widely implemented.

Enumerate irresponsible behaviors which are causing Internet instability through not following past SSAC recommendations.

Provide updated recommendations to foster greater DNS infrastructure stability.
Issues

- Increased scale and impact of attacks.
- Factors that make these amplification attacks possible.
- Prior work on mitigation techniques.
- Recommended steps to address unresolved critical issues.
Questions for Discussion

1. What steps should DNS and network operators take:
   • to resolve the issues that make such large scale DDoS attacks possible?
   • to prevent network spoofing to the greatest extent possible?
   • to identify unmanaged and inadvertently open recursive resolvers and close them?
   • to detect networks that deploy spoofable networks and run unmanaged open recursive resolvers?
Next Steps

• Send to the SSAC for review.
• Once approved and published, renew effort to evangelize and socialize the importance of security BCPs for overall Internet health and stability.
Thank you